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3.3 From the Nakba to Oslo

3.3 From the Nakba to Oslo

We were expelled, meaning we were not allowed to enter our lands. It is forbidden: we used to stand on the fences or on the mountain and we explain to our children: “we used to live here; there was the water well…” it’s important for me that my daughters will know how our lives used to be. (Abu-Bader, quoted in Abdo and Masalha 2018, 245)3

The Nakba resulted in the forceful emptying of 551 villages1 and neighbourhoods, forcing more than 770,000 Palestinians from their homes and land. The Zionist activities leading up to the declaration of independence led to the expulsion of 80 per cent of the Palestinian population, with Israel now controlling 78 per cent of the territory (Khalidi 2020)4. Following the Nakba, a period known as the “lost years” ensued, during which Palestinians appeared to have vanished from the political landscape as an independent entity, leaving a void in terms of their collective identity and aspirations (Khalidi 1997, 178--79)5.

By 1948, the British policy of divide and rule had successfully instigated factionalism within Palestine, leaving the Palestinian national identity in a state of uncertainty (Hassassian 2002)6. In the following years and decades, Israel implemented a series of laws to prevent Palestinians from returning to their homes from which they were forced to flee. One example is the Land Laws, which ensured that the properties of Palestinians who left their homes during the Nakba would be confiscated. The Absentee Property Law, enacted in 1950 as a replacement for the 1948 Emergency Regulations Regarding Absentee Property, aimed to legalise confiscating property left behind by Palestinians who were labelled “absentees” regardless of their intent to return. Subsequent laws targeted land confiscation, such as the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, which regulated the sale of such land, and the 1953 Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law, which retroactively legalised land confiscations by deeming them essential for development, settlement, or security purposes.

Other laws focused on Israeli citizenship, such as the Nationality Law of 1952, which automatically granted Israeli nationality to Jews who had been in Palestine before May 14, 1948, in accordance with the 1950 Law of Return. However, Palestinians could only acquire citizenship if they met certain criteria: being in Palestine before May 14, 1948; being registered as an inhabitant before March 1, 1952; being an inhabitant of Israel on the day the law came into force (July 14, 1952); or having continuously resided in Israeli-held territory from May 15, 1948, to July 14, 1952, or entered Israel legally during that period. Birthplace did not play a role, and by the end of the 1960s, approximately 60,000 stateless Palestinians were still living in Israel. These laws, along with subsequent ones, highlight the deliberate attempt to erase Palestinians from their land and villages.

During the 1950s, there were several Israeli military attacks on Palestinian villages in the West Bank and Gaza. One notable incident was Ariel Sharon’s attack on the al-Bureij refugee camp in Gaza, where 50 Palestinians were killed. The UN responded by issuing resolutions condemning Israeli attacks on Egypt and Syria (UN Resolutions S/RES/106 and S/RES/111), but the stage was set for war.

In October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain signed the Protocol of Sèvres, with the aim of overthrowing the Nasser government in Egypt, invading the Sinai Peninsula, and gaining control over the Suez Canal. This led to the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the capture of Rafah, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Palestinian refugees. The violence in Gaza continued, with further instances of Israeli massacres. For example, after the fall of Khan Yunis, an UNRWA investigation reported the killing of 275 Palestinians, and Israeli raids on the Rafah refugee camp resulted in the deaths of 111 more Palestinians (Hass 2010; Chomsky 1999)7 8.

Following the 1948 Nakba, Palestinian nationalism was resurgent (Khalidi 1997)5. Refugee camps, schools, and universities became hubs for the formation of various organisations. In the 1950s and early 1960s, literary publications and the establishment of grassroots organisations aimed to reinvigorate Palestinian nationalism and revive Palestinian culture and identity (Hassassian 2002)6. During this period, Fatah emerged as a movement in 1959 among Palestinians in the diaspora and later transformed into a political party in 1965. Initially, Fatah adopted a non-ideological approach and served as a reaction to other groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Movement of Arab Nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Baath Party, and communist and leftist organisations. Around the same time, in 1964, the Arab League established the PLO in Cairo to provide a voice for the Palestinian people, with the central goal of liberating Palestine (Khalidi 2020)4.

One factor contributing to the outbreak of the 1967 war was the emergence of militant Palestinian commando groups, such as Fatah, which carried out attacks on Israeli water pumping stations diverting water from the Jordan River (Khalidi 2020)4.

3.3.1 1967 and the years leading up to the first intifada

The Naksa, also known as the Setback of 1967 or the Six-Day War, marked a significant turning point when Israel conquered the Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (Khalidi 2020)4. Veracini (Veracini 2013)9 observes that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank following the 1967 conquest aimed to establish a permanent occupation and facilitate settler-colonialism. Unlike during the Nakba years, when Palestinians were violently forced out, in 1967 the remaining Palestinians did not leave (ibid.). In the aftermath of the war, the United States, under the Truman-Eisenhower administration, failed to persuade Ben-Gurion to allow the return of Palestinian Nakba refugees to their properties seized by Israel or to reduce Israel’s expansive borders.

Additionally, in 1967, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 242, emphasising the inadmissibility of acquiring territory through war. However, two loopholes in the resolution allowed Israel to retain control over the occupied territories. Firstly, UNSC Resolution 242 linked withdrawal to the establishment of secure borders, and secondly, an ambiguity in the wording of the English version of the resolution provided Israel with room to interpret and maintain its occupation and annexation of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, despite UN condemnations (Khalidi 2020)4.

Following the Naksa, the period leading up to the first intifada witnessed Yasser ‘Arafat, one of Fatah's founders, assuming its spokesperson role in 1968. Initially under Egyptian leadership, Fatah, one of the major Palestinian groups, took control of the PLO after the Naksa, with ‘Arafat becoming the chair of its Executive Committee (Khalidi 2020)4. While the re-emergence of the Palestinian national movement did not pose a strategic threat to Israel, it presented an existential discursive challenge. The very existence of Palestinians and the concept of Palestine posed a threat to Zionism (Khalidi 2020)4. Israel deliberately associated the terms “Palestine” and “Palestinian” with terrorism and hatred to address this challenge, successfully influencing political and public opinion, particularly in the United States. This period also witnessed several assassinations of PLO members, writers, poets and painters, justified through the demonisation and labelling of Palestinian groups (Khalidi 2020)4. Internationally, the PLO gained political support throughout the 1970s, particularly in the global south. This was evident in the UNGA where the United States could not employ its veto power to block resolutions. In 1974, Yasser ‘Arafat’s address to the UNGA marked a significant political success for the PLO as this was the first time the Palestinians were heard in an official international setting (Khalidi 2020)4. However, Israeli attempts to eliminate the PLO persisted. In 1982, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Israel commanded its Phalangist2 militia allies to carry out an operation in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon. This resulted in a massacre lasting three days, characterised by rape, brutal executions, and the murder of between 3,000 and 3,500 Palestinians. Ariel Sharon, the Defense Minister at the time and later Prime Minister, gained the nickname “Butcher of Sabra and Shatila” among Palestinians. A UN investigation concluded that the massacre amounted to a form of genocide, with Israel bearing responsibility for it (Ott 1983; Hirst 2007)10 11.

In the years following the Naksa, Israel violated the Fourth Geneva Convention by allowing Israeli settlers to occupy the territories of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Article 49 of the Convention explicitly prohibits the transfer of an occupying power’s civilian population into the occupied territory. It forbids forced transfers or deportations of protected persons (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 1949)12. These actions solidified the establishment of an apartheid regime comparable to the system once existing in South Africa (Tilley 2012)13, characterised by ethnic cleansing, land confiscation, discriminatory legislation, and military occupation. This regime operated and continues to operate within a political system built upon structural racism, segregation, and dominance (White 2009)14.

The Israeli settler-colonial occupation has been depicted in various ways:

Domestically it has presented the Palestinian occupied territories as part of the “eternal Jewish homeland,” thereby including Jewish settlers in those territories as full state citizens, despite the fact that they live outside the official bounds of the state. At the same time, internationally, Israel has presented the same occupied territories as “temporarily administered,” thereby excluding their Palestinian residents from political participation, leaving them powerless to shape the future of their own homeland. (Yiftachel and Yacobi 2006, 172)15

3.3.2 From the grassroots to the politicisation of the first intifada

القشة التي قصمت ظهر البعير
(The straw that broke the camel's back, Arabic proverb)

(Gordon 2008)16 argues that before the first intifada, the political and military establishment in Israel had a skewed perception of the situation. They believed that the native Palestinians welcomed Israeli settlers and the perceived improvements in their living conditions. However, this view was far from the reality. Israel had established over 200 settlements in the occupied West Bank during the two decades following the 1967 war (Khalidi 2020)4.

Any expression of nationalism—flying the Palestinian flag, displaying the Palestinian colors, organising trade unions, voicing support for the PLO or any other resistance organisation—was severely suppressed, with fines, beatings, and jail. Detentions and imprisonment usually featured torture of detainees. Protesting the occupation publicly or in print could lead to the same result or even to deportation. More active resistance, especially that involving violence, invited collective punishment, house demolitions, imprisonment without trial under the rubric of “administrative detention” that could last for years, and even extrajudicial murder. That year, mayoral candidates backed by the PLO won municipal elections in Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, and al-Bireh, as well as in other towns. A number of the mayors were deported in 1980, accused of incitement, and others were removed from office by the military occupation authorities in the spring of 1982, provoking widespread unrest (Khalidi 2020, 170)4.

The period since the late 1960s witnessed the emergence of a new generation of Palestinians who grew up under Israeli occupation. This generation displayed greater fearlessness in expressing support for the PLO and organising demonstrations against the military occupation. However, these actions were met with brutal repression by Israeli forces, leading to cumulative effects (Khalidi 2020)4. The mounting unrest in the occupied territories was evident in the approximately five thousand annual military court cases against Palestinians (Gordon 2008)16. On December 8, 1987, an Israeli military transport collided with a convoy of cars carrying Palestinian labourers from Gaza to Israel. This incident is often seen as the catalyst for the intifada, although any other event could have similarly ignited the growing unrest and resistance.

The intifada was not just a mobilisation of Palestinians; it also aimed to correct the world’s perception of the Palestinian struggle. Palestinian intellectuals played a crucial role in demonstrating the unsustainability of the occupation and challenging global perceptions (Khalidi 2020, 174)4. I will further discuss these tactics of deliberate maiming as part of the biopower and body politics discussed in Chapter Six of this work.

The uprising against the settler-colonial conditions experienced by Palestinians cannot be solely attributed to political repression. It must also be understood within the context of colonial subjugation, which encompasses economic exploitation, institutional destruction, and cultural and ideological repression (Farsoun and Landis 1990)17. Economically, the Israeli occupation played a significant role in transforming Israel into an imperial economy, relying on the captive human and material resources of the occupied territories (Shadid 1988, 121)18. Palestinians were forcibly dependent on Israeli goods, becoming Israel’s second-largest export market, while their own export market was severely restricted by Israel’s imposed tariff system and other obstacles. Additionally, Israel confiscated fertile agricultural land and restricted access to water sources in the West Bank and Gaza, which resulted in a decline in Palestinian agriculture while benefiting Israel. The dire economic situation forced many Palestinians to seek employment as day labourers in Israel, with unofficial estimates suggesting much higher numbers than the official count of over 94,000 in 1986. Palestinian economic institutions were systematically hindered or destroyed, and the Israeli Shekel became the default currency. Israeli military authorities controlled social and economic activities by granting or revoking permits and licenses. Unions were targeted, with leaders facing administrative detention, house arrest, deportation, intimidation, and harassment. In response, Palestinian political and nationalist activism grew, with grassroots organisations providing medical and agricultural aid and establishing local councils, associations, educational institutions, and welfare organisations. This emerging civil society stood in opposition to Israeli hegemony (Farsoun and Landis 1990)17.

Cultural and ideological repression also played a significant role. Israel suppressed any form of collective identity and collective will, including prohibiting the use of the four colours present in the Palestinian flag. Palestinian history and cultural content were systematically erased from educational textbooks, which were replaced by Israeli versions. The name “Palestine” was effectively expunged. These policies aimed to undermine Palestinian cultural and historical consciousness (Farsoun and Landis 1990)17. The culmination of two decades of settler-colonialism, combined with the aforementioned Israeli policies and violence, led to the eruption of the intifada (ibid.). Simultaneously, Israel pursued a longstanding policy of assassinating Palestinian organisers who gained influence within the resistance against the occupation (Bergman 2018)19.

The origins of the intifada are rooted in the framework of Zionist settler-colonialism, which gave rise to Israel and continues to oppress the Palestinians. To establish this connection, we must look back to 1967 when Israel gained control over Gaza and the West Bank. The subsequent military rule granted Israel complete control over Palestinian life, encompassing various aspects such as legal, civic, and political rights, land and water rights, licensing, taxation, trade, services, security, education, health, and social welfare (Farsoun and Landis 1990, 19)17. Under military rule, Israeli authorities did not need to justify their actions to anyone and could make or suspend laws without public review or accountability to any Israeli governmental or public body (Roy 1986)20. The “Iron Fist” policy implemented by Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin involved the use of “force, might, beatings” (Clines 1988)21, as he himself stated. This policy led to the breaking of protesters’ limbs, skull fractures, and beatings inflicted on anyone who provoked the ire of Israeli soldiers (Khalidi 2020, 169)4.

During the intifada, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), a Palestinian Islamist political and militant organisation founded in 1987, grew in popularity, which the PLO viewed as a growing problem, particularly as they aspired to participate in international negotiations as the representatives of the Palestinians. This led the PLO to adopt the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (Darwish 1988)22 on 15 November 1988, relinquishing claims to the original territory of Palestine and accepting a two-state solution. Yasser Arafat subsequently accepted US conditions for bilateral dialogue with Israel. Unbeknownst to the PLO, they found themselves engaged in a process designed by Israel and supported by the USA with the intention of prolonging the occupation. By accepting UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations, the PLO made their mission for decolonisation virtually impossible. The limitations imposed on Palestinians during the Camp David talks in 1979 persisted during the Madrid conference in 1991. Although self-rule was discussed, critical issues such as Palestinian self-determination, sovereignty, refugee return, the end of settler colonisation and occupation, control of land and water, the Jewish settlement problem, and the disposition of Jerusalem were excluded from the negotiations. However, the intifada demonstrated that Israel could not solely maintain control over the occupied territories through military force. This realisation prompted Rabin to allow direct contact with the PLO while still imposing limited self-rule. The outcome was the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, in which Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO recognised the state of Israel (Khalidi 2020)4.

3.3.3 Oslo and the start of institutionalised militarisation

The Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements led to the establishment of the PA as an interim administration in Gaza and the West Bank, intending to build a future Palestinian State and develop a viable economy. According to (Gordon 2008)16, Israel faced challenges in maintaining control and suppressing uprisings in the occupied territories, prompting the deliberate creation of a “subcontractor” to assume this role: the PA (also discussed by Roy 2007)23. In exchange for providing certain services to Israel, the PA gained a limited form of autonomous self-rule over a small portion of the territory. At the same time, Israel retained control over the majority through an “outsourcing” strategy. This approach can be understood as a mechanism the occupying power employs to conceal its mechanisms and maintain control (Gordon 2008)16. Under this arrangement, the PA assumed responsibility for managing the Palestinian population, including areas such as education, health, culture, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, while Israel maintained control over Palestinian territory (Gordon 2008)16. However, Israel still exercised influence over Palestinian education by having veto power over the inclusion of certain topics in subjects like geography and history (ibid.). This censorship resulted in textbooks that omitted significant aspects of Palestinian history. As I will show in Chapter Five, this practice continues to this day, as reported by a Palestinian I interviewed who worked for the Ministry of Education and Higher Education of the Palestinian National Authority.

According to (Roy 2007)23, the Oslo Accords can be seen as a continuation of the colonisation of Palestinian land, following the Allon Plan of 1967 and the Drobless Plan of 1978, which aimed to annex the West Bank and establish settlements for demographic and geographic control. Roy argues that the Oslo process did not end Israeli occupation but instead reinforced and strengthened it: “The Oslo process, therefore, did not represent the end of Israeli occupation but its continuation, albeit in a less direct form. The structural relationship between occupier and occupied, and the gross asymmetries in power that attend it, were not dismantled by the accords but reinforced and strengthened” (Roy 2007, 236)23. The Interim Agreement of September 1995, known as Oslo II, further highlighted the limited nature of the accords, as it referred to redeployment rather than withdrawal and excluded key issues such as Jerusalem, settlements, borders, and Palestinian refugees from the scope of the agreement.

The Oslo Agreements resulted in the partitioning of the West Bank into three areas. Area A, comprising 18 per cent of the territory, is under the civilian and internal security responsibility of the PA. Area B, making up around 22 per cent, sees the PA in charge of economic, educational, and health matters, with Israel maintaining control over external security. The remaining 60 per cent of the West Bank, Area C, remains under full Israeli control, despite being scheduled for transfer to PA control in 1999. Here, Israel retains the power to pursue any Palestinian individual. While Oslo created the illusion of Palestinian sovereignty through the establishment of the PA, the reality is that it lacked authority over territory, violence, and mobility. According to (Le More 2005)24, the Oslo Accords resulted in Palestinians coming under the jurisdiction and responsibility of the PA. Israel was able to begin with the separation of the people from the land without having to end the occupation and, thus, “to keep the land but not the Indigenous population” (Weinberger 2002, 11)25. The PA’s jurisdiction also extends to protecting illegal Israeli settlements and their inhabitants without the ability to arrest or imprison Israeli citizens.

Based on Derek Gregory’s concept of the performance of sovereignty, (Gordon 2008)16 argues that the Oslo Accords created a simulated image of a coherent state in the Occupied Territories despite the territory's fragmented and ruptured nature. The archipelagos of control established by the Oslo Accords, under the authority of the PA, cannot be considered sovereign because Israel ensured that the PA did not have a monopoly over the use of violence or control over the movement of people. Gordon refers to this as the “illusion of establishing full Palestinian sovereignty,” as the Oslo Accords did not establish the traditional link between sovereign power and territorial authority (Gordon 2008)16. Following Oslo, Gaza experienced increasing restrictions imposed by Israel, including military encirclements on land and at sea, as well as the implementation of travel permits that confined Palestinians in Gaza and prevented them from accessing other territories. Additionally, Jerusalem became physically disconnected from the West Bank and Gaza, resulting in the stifling of the Palestinian economy, culture, and politics within the city.

Edward Said (Said 1996)26 astutely predicted that Palestine would not achieve independence with the signing of the Oslo Accords, as he argued that the PA would remain weak and dependent. (Turner 2011)27 further argues that despite being revered by many as the father of the nation, Yasser ‘Arafat’s leadership saw mounting opposition due to corruption and authoritarianism. However, Israel and international donors overlooked these issues, believing that ‘Arafat could control the opposition. They continued to provide support, enabling strong executive and security institutions to be built. The perspective on ‘Arafat and the PA changed following the outbreak of the second intifada, altering Israel’s and its allies’ perception of ‘Arafat.

References

  1. The Israeli organisation Zochrot has documented 551 villages and other localities that were either destroyed or confiscated. It is hard to visualise a three-digit number as representation of the destruction that took place. Hence, an exclusive list of the names in alphabetical order provides a more visually striking representation, without having to show images: ‘Ajjur, ‘Akbara, ‘Allar, ‘Alma, ‘Ammuqa, ‘Amqa, ‘Aqqur, ‘Arab al-’Arida, ‘Arab al-Bawati, ‘Arab al-Nufay’at, ‘Arab al-Safa, ‘Arab al-Samniyya, ‘Arab al-Shamalina, ‘Arab al-Zubayd, ‘Arab Sufiyin, ‘Arab Suqrir (Abu Suweira), ‘Arab Zahrat al-Dumayri, ‘Artuf, ‘Asluj, ‘Atlit, ‘Atlit - March of Return, ‘Awlam, ‘Ayn al-Mansi, ‘Ayn al-Zaytun, ‘Ayn Ghazal, ‘Ayn Hawd, ‘Islin, Abil al-Qamh, Abu al-Fadl (Satariyya), Abu Ghalyun, Abu Jaber/Jbarat, Abu Kishk, Abu Middain\Hanajreh, Abu Rawwaa/Jbarat, Abu Samara, Abu Shusha (Haifa), Abu Shusha (Ramla), Abu Zurayq, Ajanjul, Akka, al-’Abbasiyya (Yahudiyya), al-’Abisiyya (Safed), al-’Araqib, al-’Imara, al-’Ubaydiyya, al-’Ulmaniyya, al-’Urayfiyya, al-Ashrafiyya, al-Bassa, al-Batani al-Gharbi, al-Batani al-Sharqi, al-Bira, al-Birwa, al-Burayj, al-Burj, al-Butayha, al-Butaymat, al-Buwayziyya, al-Dalhamiyya, al-Damun, al-Dawayima, al-Dawwara, al-Dirbashiyya, al-Dirdara, al-Faluja, al-Farradiyya, al-Fatur, al-Ghabisiyya, al-Ghazzawiyya, al-Ghubayya al-Fawqa, al-Ghubayya al-Tahta, al-Haditha, al-Hamidiyya, al-Hamma, al-Hamra (Baysan), al-Hamra (Safed), al-Haram (Sayyidna ‘Ali), al-Husayniyya, Al-Ja’una, al-Jaladiyya, al-Jalama (Haifa), al-Jalama (Tul-karem), al-Jammama, al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, al-Jammasin al-Sharqi, al-Jiyya, al-Jura (Gaza), al-Jura (Jerusalem), al-Kabri, al-Kafrayn, al-Khalasa, al-Khalisa, al-Khayma, al-Khayriyya, al-Khisas, al-Khunayzir, al-Khureiba, al-Kunayyisa, al-Lajjun, al-Latrun, al-Lydd, al-Maghar, al-Majdal (Gaza), al-Majdal (Tiberias), al-Maliha, al-Malikiyya, al-Manara, al-Manshiyya (Acre), al-Manshiyya (Safed), al-Manshiyya Neighborhood (Yaffa), al-Mansi, al-Mansura (Aka), al-Mansura (Gaza), al-Mansura (Ramla), al-Mansura (Safed), al-Mansura (Tiberias), al-Mas’udiyya (Summayl), al-Masmiyya al-Kabira, al-Masmiyya al-Saghira, al-Mazar (Haifa), al-Mazar (Jenin), al-Mirr (Mahmudiya), al-Muftakhira, al-Muharraqa, al-Mujaydal, al-Mukhayzin, al-Murassas, al-Muwaylih, al-Na’ani, al-Na’ima, al-Nabi Rubin (Aka), al-Nabi Rubin (Ramla), al-Nabi Yusha’, al-Naghnaghiyya, al-Nahr, al-Nuqayb, al-Qabu, al-Qastal, al-Qubab, al-Qubayba (Hebron), al-Qubayba (Ramla), al-Qudayriyya, al-Quds (Jerusalem), al-Ramla, al-Ras al-Ahmar, al-Rihaniyya, al-Ruways, al-Safiriyya, al-Sakhina, al-Salihiyya, al-Samakiyya, al-Samiriyya, al-Sammu’i, al-Samra, al-Sanbariyya, al-Sarafand, al-Sawafir al-Gharbiyya, al-Sawafir al-Shamaliyya, al-Sawafir al-Sharqiyya, al-Sawakhneh/Azazema, al-Sawalima, al-Sawamir, al-Shajara, al-Shawka al-Tahta, al-Shaykh Muwannis, al-Sheikh Bureik, al-Shuna, al-Sindiyana, al-Smeeri/Hanajreh, al-Sumayriyya, al-Tabigha, al-Tall, al-Tantura, al-Tina, al-Tira (Baysan), al-Tira (Haifa), al-Tira (Ramla), al-Walaja, al-Wayziyya, al-Yajur, al-Zahiriyya al-Tahta, al-Zanghariyya, al-Zawiya, al-Zeeb, al-Zuq al-Fawqani, al-Zuq at-Tahtani, al-Zuwaira, Alamat Abu Jugaim/Tayaha, Alamat Abu Libbeh/Tayaha, Alamat Abu Shunnar/Tayaha, Amarin Bin Ajlan/Jbarat, Aqir, Arab ‘Awassat, Arab al Asiyat, Arab al-Fuqara’, Arab al-Qilai, Arab Ghawarina, Arab Shubaki, Arab Subeihat (East), Arab Subhiyin (South), Arab Zarra’a, Ayn Karim, Balad al-Shaykh, Barbara, Barfiliya, Barqa, Barqusya, Barrat Qisarya, Barriyya, Bashshit, Bassat al-Falek (Birket Ramadan), Baysamun, Bayt ‘Affa, Bayt ‘Itab, Bayt Dajan, Bayt Daras, Bayt Jibrin, Bayt Jirja, Bayt Jiz, Bayt Mahsir, Bayt Nabala, Bayt Naqquba, Bayt Nattif, Bayt Nuba, Bayt Shanna, Bayt Susin, Bayt Thul, Bayt Tima, Bayt Umm al-Mays, Bayyarat Hannun, Bdinat/Tayaha, Beisan, Beit Mazmil, Beli/Tayaha, Beni Okbeh/Tayaha, Bi’lin, Bir Ma’in, Bir Saba’ (Beersheba), Bir Salim, Biriyya, Biyar ‘Adas, Burayka, Burayr, Daliyat al-Rawha’, Dallata, Daniyal, Danna, Dayr ‘Amr, Dayr Aban, Dayr Abu Salama, Dayr al-Dubban, Dayr al-Hawa, Dayr al-Qasi, Dayr al-Shaykh, Dayr Ayyub, Dayr Muhaysin, Dayr Nakhkhas, Dayr Rafat, Dayr Sunayd, Dayr Tarif, Dayr Yasin, Dayshum, Dimra, Eilabun, Ein Jiddi (‘Arab Rashayida), Fajja, Fara, Faraheen/Azazema, Fardisya, Farwana, Fir’im, Fisherman’s Village, Galazin Thawabti/Jabarat, Galazin/Tayaha, Gatatweh/Tayaha, Ghabat ‘Ababisha, Ghabat Kafr Sur, Ghabbatiyya, Ghawali ‘Abu Amrah/Tarabin, Ghawali Abu al-Hussain/Tarabin, Ghawali Abu Bakrah/Tarabin, Ghawali Abu Khatleh/Tarabin, Ghawali Abu Shalhoub/Tarabin, Ghawali Abu Sitteh/Tarabin, Ghawali Al Zraiye/Tarabin, Ghawali al-Omour/Tarabin, Ghuraba, Ghuwayr Abu Shusha, Hadatha, Haifa, Hamama, Harrawi, Hasanat Abu Muailiq/Tarabin, Hasanat Bani Sabbah/Jbarat, Hatta, Hawsha, Hiribya, Hittin, Hkuk Abu Abdoun/Tayaha, Hkuk al-Assad/Tayaha, Hkuk al-Buraiqi/Tayaha, Hkuk al-Huzaiyil/Tayaha, Huj, Hulayqat, Hunin, Ibdis, Idnibba, Ijlil al-Qibliyya, Ijlil al-Shamaliyya, Ijzim, Imwas, Indur, Innaba, Iqrit, Iraq al-Manshiyya, Iraq Suwaydan, Irteimat Abu Al Udous/Jbarat, Irteimat al-Fukara/Jbarat, Isdud, Ishwa’, Jaba’, Jabbul, Jahula, Janabib/Zullam/Tayaha, Jarash, Jarawin Abu Ghalion/Tarabin, Jarawin Abu Suailiq/Tarabin, Jarawin Abu Yehya/Tarabin, Jarisha, Jbarat al-Diqs/Jbarat, Jbarat al-Wuhaidat/Jbarat, Jilya, Jimzu, Jindas, Jubb Yusuf, Julis, Jusayr, Kabara, Kafr ‘Ana, Kafr ‘Inan, Kafr Bir’im, Kafr Lam, Kafr Saba, Kafr Sabt, Kafra, Karatiyya, Kasla, Kawfakha, Kawkab al-Hawa, Kawkaba, Khan al-Duwayr, Kharruba, Khirbat ‘Ateer, Khirbat ‘Iribbin, Khirbat al-’Umur, Khirbat al-Burj (Haifa), Khirbat al-Damun, Khirbat al-Duhayriyya, Khirbat al-Jawfa, Khirbat al-Kasair, Khirbat al-Khasif, Khirbat al-Lawz, Khirbat al-Majdal, Khirbat al-Manara, Khirbat al-Mansura, Khirbat al-Muntar, Khirbat al-Qaryatayn, Khirbat al-Sarkas, Khirbat al-Shuna (Haifa), Khirbat al-Tannur, Khirbat al-Taqa, Khirbat al-Wa’ara al-Sawda, Khirbat al-Zababida, Khirbat al-Zawiya, Khirbat Bayt Far, Khirbat Bayt Lid, Khirbat Buwayra, Khirbat Ism Allah, Khirbat Jiddin, Khirbat Karraza, Khirbat Qumbaza, Khirbat Sa’sa’, Khirbat Umm al-Shaqaf, Khirbat Umm Burj, Khirbat Umm Sabuna, Khirbat Zakariyya, Khirbat Zalafa, Khirbet al-Khisas, Khirbet al-Manshiyya, Khirbet Khresh, Khirbet Lid (al-’Awwadin), Khiyam al-Walid, Khubbayza, Khulda, Kirad al-Baqqara, Kirad al-Ghannama, Kudna, Kurnub, Kuwaykat, Lazzaza, Lifta, Lubya, Ma’alul, Ma’dhar, Madahil, Majdal Yaba\ al-Sadiq, Mallaha, Manshiyyat Samakh, Mansurat al-Khayt, Maqura, Marus, Masil al-Jizl, Masoudiyeen/Azazema, Mi’ar, Mirun, Miska, Mohamediyeen/Azazema, Mughallis, Mughr al-Druz, Mughr al-Khayt, Mureiat/Azazema, Muzayri’a, Nabaat/Tarabin, Nabi Thari, Najamat Abu Athera/Tarabin, Najamat Abu Sousain/Tarabin, Najamat Abu Suhaiban/Tarabin, Najamat al-Ksar/Tarabin, Najamat al-Sani/Tarabin, Najamat al-Soufi/Tarabin, Najd, Nasir al-Din, Nazareth, Ni’ilya, Nimrin, Nitaf, Ntoush al-Atawneh/Tayaha, Nuris, Nuseirat, Nuseirat\Hanajreh, Qabba’a, Qadas, Qaddita, Qalunya, Qannir, Qaqun, Qastina, Qatra, Qaytiyya, Qazaza, Qdeirat Abo al-Asam/Tayaha, Qdeirat Abu Kaff/Tayaha, Qdeirat Abu Rqayiq/Tayaha, Qdeirat al-Sani/Tayaha, Qira (Qira and Qamun), Qisarya, Qula, Qumya, Ra’na, Ramadeen Masamereh/Tayaha, Ramadeen Sho’our/Tayaha, Raml Zayta, Rantiya, Ras Abu ‘Ammar, Rawashdeh/Tayaha, Sa’sa’, Saadneh Abu Jraiban/Jbarat, Saadneh al-Nuwairi/Jbarat, Sabalan, Sabbarin, Safad (Tzfat city), Safsaf, Safuriyya, Sajad, Salama, Salbit, Saliha, Samakh, Saqiya, Sar’a, Sarafand al-’Amar, Sarafand al-Kharab, Saris, Sataf, Sawarkeh Bin Rifee/Jbarat, Saydun, Shahma, Shatta, Sheikh Bureik, Sheikh Nuran, Sheikh Saeed al Qurani, Shilta, Shlalyeen/Shlalyeen/Tayaha, Simsim, Sirin, Suba, Subaihat/Azazema, Subhiyeen/Azazema, Sufla, Suhmata, Summil (Gaza), Suruh, Susiya, Tabariya, Tabsur (Khirbet ‘Azzun), Tall al-Hunud, Tall al-Safi, Tall al-Shawk, Tall al-Turmus, Tarbikha, Tarshiha, Taytaba, Tulayl, Uja al Hafeer, Umm ‘Ajra, Umm al-Faraj, Umm al-Rashrash, Umm al-Shawf, Umm al-Zinat, Umm Kalkha, Umm Khalid, Urour/Tayaha, Wa’arat al-Sarris, Wadi ‘Ara, Wadi al-Hamam, Wadi al-Hawarith, Wadi Haunayn, Wadi Qabbani, Wadi Zubalah, Wuhaidat al-Tarabin/Tarabin, Wulaydeh/Jbarat, Yafa (Jaffa), Yalu, Yaquq, Yarda, Yasur, Yazur, Yibna, Yubla, Zab’a, Zakariyya, Zarabeh, Zarabeh/Jbarat, Zarnuqa, Zayta, Zikrin, Zir’in, Zullam Abu Grainat/Tayaha, Zullam Abu Juwayed/Tayaha, Zullam Abu Rbai’a/Tayaha. (Zochrot 2014)28 ↩

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  21. Clines, Francis X. 1988. Talk With Rabin: Roots of the Conflict - The New York Times. Https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/05/world/talk-with-rabin-roots-of-the-conflict.html. ↩

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