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3.4 Oppressing Palestinians

3.4 Oppressing Palestinians: Israel and its Palestinian subcontractor

3.4.1 The second intifada

The signing of the Oslo Accords resulted in strict controls and restrictions imposed on the Palestinian population, including checkpoints, barbed wire fences, and a complex permit system that limited the movement of people and goods. Only a small group of Palestinians with close ties to the PA benefited from the normalisation between the PA and Israel. The second intifada, which began in September 2000, was fuelled by a long period of growing frustration among Palestinians. By that time, the West Bank was already dotted with heavily militarised illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The militarisation of these settlements reflected a recognition of the escalating tension and frustration among the Palestinian population, partly exacerbated by the role of the PA as a subcontractor in the violence (Baroud 2006)1.

The tipping point for the second intifada was Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Haram al-Sharif, accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli armed police, despite warnings from the Palestinians. This visit aimed to assert Israeli sovereignty over the compound. The protests that followed in and around the Al-Aqsa quickly spread through East Jerusalem and Ramallah, triggering the intifada and a period of intense destruction and bloodshed on both sides. The subcontracting and security cooperation that emerged from the Oslo Accords led to a significant increase in small arms in the West Bank, which had various consequences and created different dynamics compared to the first intifada. According to one of my interlocutors, there were “significant differences between the first intifada and the second intifada.” (Interview, May 2019).

Unlike the first intifada, where Palestinians had no access to weapons, during the second intifada, the Palestinians were able to confront Israeli forces with some firepower. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, several groups (such as the PA, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad) gained access to guns. As a result, the Israeli forces were able to justify their use of lethal force in the eyes of the international media. However, one must note the vast disparity between handguns and heavily armoured soldiers, vehicles or aircraft. Between 2000 and 2002, Israel’s massive retaliation resulted in the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and the imprisonment of individuals who were unprepared for the challenges of detention.

Three weeks after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the UNSC passed Resolution 1322, which condemned both Sharon’s visit and the subsequent Israeli violence against the Palestinians (Cook 2001)2. The violence extended to Gaza, where there were suspicions of an Israeli chemical attack in the Khan Yunis area (ibid.). Israeli tanks also entered the West Bank in the months that followed. Tragically, a significant number of children were among the Palestinian fatalities caused by Israeli violence (Baroud 2006)1. Sharon provided the Israeli Knesset with a comprehensive list of Palestinian leaders and activists marked for assassination, which the Israeli government and its Western supporters referred to as “targeted killings” (ibid.). Throughout the five-year intifada, hundreds of Palestinians lost their lives as a result.

The escalation of violence was staggering. In the initial days of the second intifada, Israeli forces used a large amount of live ammunition against unarmed Palestinian protesters and fired 1.3 million bullets (Pedatzur 2004)3. Israeli soldiers were given the authorisation to shoot without limit, resulting in a significant number of Palestinian casualties (ibid.).

The Israeli military staff aimed to demonstrate their superiority over the Palestinians by inflicting heavy blows and weakening them: “until the recognition of their weakness vis-a-vis Israel’s might is burned into their consciousness” to compel them to return to negotiations (Pedatzur 2004)3. In response to the Israeli violence, Palestinians resorted to suicide bombings that targeted indiscriminately within Israel. However, while the media largely ignored the Israeli assassinations and other forms of violence inflicted upon Palestinians, the suicide bombings received extensive coverage, which contributed to portraying Palestinians as terrorists and militants without delving into the underlying motivations behind their actions (Baroud 2006)1. Palestinians, including members of the PA Security Forces, also resorted to armed resistance, using weapons and explosives. In turn, Israel responded with tanks, helicopters, heavy weapons, and artillery, resulting in even higher numbers of Palestinian casualties, and the destruction of a lot of the PA infrastructure (Khalidi 2020)4. Palestinian armed resistance groups extended the violence that was previously concentrated in the West Bank to Israel by targeting vulnerable civilian areas such as buses and public places (ibid.).

The second intifada witnessed a significant increase in mobility restrictions imposed by Israel, exerting control over the movement of Palestinians between Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, as well as within the West Bank itself, which are continuing to this day. Fixed checkpoints, manned by heavily armed soldiers or private security personnel, regulated the passage of pedestrians and vehicles, the consequences of which will be discussed in Chapter Five and Six. Some checkpoints (known as partial checkpoints) are occasionally unstaffed. Observation towers became tools used to monitor movement. Palestinian vehicle access started to become limited through the use of earth mounds, walls, roadblocks, trenches, road gates, and barriers (B'Tselem 2017)5.

Simultaneously, the construction of the “separation wall”, better known as the Wall of Apartheid or annexation wall, began during the second intifada. The wall is a formidable structure consisting of eight-meter-tall concrete slabs, guard towers, cameras, razor wire, military-only roads, tunnels, trenches, checkpoints, gateways, and massive metal gates. Certain wall sections have been completed, while others are still under construction. The final length of the wall is projected to be 712 kilometres, twice the length of the Green Line, which spans 320 kilometres (ibid.). Once finished, the wall will separate 52,667.7 hectares of land, equivalent to 9.4% of the West Bank, including annexed municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, from the rest of the West Bank (ibid.). As of 2017, approximately 460 kilometres (around 65% of the planned construction) had been completed, with 53 kilometres (around 7.5%) under construction and an additional 200 kilometres planned but yet to be initiated (ibid.).

3.4.2 The Palestinian schism

Since the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, Fatah has been the dominant political force in Palestinian politics. However, Hamas, founded during the first intifada, quickly emerged as a separate and more militant Islamist alternative to the PLO (Khalidi 2020)4. Unlike the PLO, Hamas rejected the abandonment of armed struggle and sought to reclaim the entire pre-1948 territory of Palestine, not just the territories occupied in 1967 (Baconi 2018)6. Israel withheld tax transfers to the PA, violating the Paris Protocol of 1994 and jeopardising the PA’s payroll obligations. The World Bank estimated a 44% decline in total PA revenue between October 2005 and January 2006 (Khalidi 2020)4.

In 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza. This plan was initially launched by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003, and the Knesset approved the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law (Knesset 2004)7. As a result, close to 8,500 Israeli settlers and the Israeli military were withdrawn. The 2006 elections following the second intifada resulted in a surprising victory for Hamas, leading to political turmoil as Fatah, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) after ‘Arafat’s death in 2004, refused to accept the election results (Khalidi 2020)4. (Khalidi 2020, 210)4 argues that Hamas’ electoral success can be attributed to a perceived failure of the secular nationalist ideologies that had long dominated Middle Eastern politics.

The following year, Hamas won elections and, by 2007, had assumed control over Gaza, prompting Israel to implement a comprehensive blockade that remains in effect. This blockade, maintained jointly with Egypt, controlled the flow of goods and people in and out of Gaza, severely impacting its economy and limiting access to employment and medical treatment abroad. Consequently, numerous human rights organisations have likened the conditions in Gaza to an “open-air prison” (Human Rights Watch 2022)8. Critics argue that Israel has exploited the Hamas governance in Gaza to deepen Palestinian divisions, which has strategically benefited Israeli political agendas, such as expanding settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, when settlers were withdrawn from Gaza, the number of settlers in the West Bank grew with 15,800.

Gaza became isolated after the electoral win of Hamas in 2007, but the story starts earlier. The historical narrative of Gaza shifted significantly during the 1948 war and the Palestinian Nakba. During this period, Palestinian refugees from surrounding towns and villages in present-day Israel were compelled to seek safety in the Gaza Strip, causing the population there to almost triple suddenly. Gaza is home to more than 1.7 million descendants of these refugees. With a population exceeding 2.2 million and over half children, Gaza is one of the most densely populated regions globally. The Gaza Strip measures 365 square kilometres.

Additionally, the Quartet, consisting of the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), and the UN, rejected the formation of a unity government that did not recognise Israel, renounce violence, and accept previous agreements, including the Oslo Accords and the Road Map. In 2007, a split occurred when Abbas dissolved the unity government by excluding Hamas and appointed Salam Fayyad as the head of a West Bank government, followed by an international lockdown of Gaza. The United States initiated a boycott against the Hamas-led PA, implementing mechanisms to bypass the PA in favour of Fatah.

The boycott of Hamas led to the closure of Gaza’s Qarni crossing, exacerbating a severe humanitarian crisis with significant food shortages. In 2007, as a result of the PA refusing to hand over power, Hamas took control of PA security and civil institutions in Gaza, resulting in the collapse of Fatah’s power in the Gaza Strip. The PA launched security campaigns using strong-arm tactics, redeploying trained and equipped security forces to areas of the West Bank where the PA’s authority and control were challenged (Tartir 2019)9.

As mentioned earlier, the Oslo Accords had already given the PA the responsibility of protecting Israeli settlers and settlements. However, during the second intifada, US-trained PA Security Forces conducted campaigns to counter Hamas and Islamic Jihad activities, integrate Fatah fighters into the Security Forces, and restore public order (International Crisis Group 2008)10. The main objective of these offensive actions was to establish what can be seen as a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere:

This meant that the PA’s statutory security forces were the only bodies with the right and exclusivity to control the security realm. In accordance with the Weberian model, other nonstate actors, nonstatutory bodies, and armed resistance groups had to be marginalized, dismantled, co-opted, integrated, disarmed, or punished. Within the overall context of Israeli occupation and colonisation, however, the Weberian model is fraught with tensions and contradictions. (Tartir 2019, 222)9

The PA, as established in the Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements, was assigned the role of subcontractor for Israel’s security. This positioned the PA within a conflicted system where it had to address Israel’s security demands while also pursuing its own interests in terms of power and control over its territories and people. (Turner 2011)11 highlights that the PA’s obligations as enforcers of Israel’s security contradict its aspirations as a Palestinian liberation movement. The discourse surrounding Security Sector Reform (SSR) revolves around the concept of liberal peace, which provides a seemingly politically neutral justification based on principles like good governance, human rights, and security. It portrays power as empowering rather than oppressive (Mustafa 2015)12.

The strengthening of the PA Security Forces was stipulated in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords 1993)13, in which the Council was to establish a strong police force. To understand how SSR is implemented in the areas controlled by the PA, we need to examine the theoretical foundations of SSR. SSR is rooted in the liberal state-building paradigm and the Western idea of “good governance.” (Chappuis and Hänggi 2013)14 identify three main objectives of SSR: socioeconomic development, democratisation, and post-conflict peacebuilding. These objectives require a security sector that upholds the rule of law and respects human rights. SSR is not a request from the local population but rather a tool employed by the “International Community” to “restore” state authority. In this framework, the state has a monopoly on the use of force, but it must operate within the rule of law and uphold human rights to protect the state and its people. Despite concerns about protection against occupiers and the limitations of the PA’s security forces, the donor-sponsored SSR programs, which included Israeli-controlled and limited training, as well as EU and US-led training of the Palestinian Civil Police and PA security forces, did not adequately address these concerns (ibid.).

As of 2016, the Palestinian security sector consisted of 83,276 personnel in the West Bank and Gaza, over a 36% increase from 53,000 in 2003 (Tartir 2015, 2019)15 9. Within the West Bank, SSR has been utilised as a biopolitical technique to subject Palestinians to population control and surveillance (Gordon 2008)16, also known as biopolitical imperialism (Kienscherf 2011)17. On closer examination, SSR, which aims to protect the state and its population (Chappuis and Hänggi 2013)14, as implemented in Palestine through security assistance to the PA, ultimately results in the protection of the Israeli state, often leading to the use of force against the Palestinian population.

Instances of such violence became apparent during the second intifada in 2002 when Israeli military violence targeted refugee camps, believing them to be the originators of suicide bombings. This resulted in frequent incursions by the Israeli military into both Gaza and the West Bank, with devastating consequences. Refugee camps like Balata and Jenin, established as a consequence of the 1948 Nakba, were particularly affected. These camps shared socioeconomic challenges such as large household sizes, young populations, and high unemployment rates (UNWRA 2015b, 2015a)18 19. They had also played an active role in armed resistance during the first intifada. The Jenin camp experienced a heavy battle with the Israeli military, resulting in the destruction of a significant portion of the camp, leaving a quarter of the population homeless and causing numerous casualties. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International accused Israel of committing war crimes during these events (Amnesty International 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002)20 21.

In 2007, the PA Security Forces (PASF) targeted the refugee camps as part of their efforts to consolidate Fatah’s power. This led to a siege on the Jenin and Balata refugee camps orchestrated jointly by the PASF and the Israeli military. As (Tartir 2019)9 points out, the power dynamics in the Palestinian political landscape remain largely unchanged, with Hamas still in power in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank.

References

  1. Baroud, Ramzy. 2006. The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle. Pluto Press. Pluto Press. ↩↩↩

  2. Cook, Jonathan. 2001. Vale of Tears. Https://www.jonathan-cook.net/2001-04-05/vale-of-tears/. ↩

  3. Pedatzur, Reuven. 2004. More Than a Million Bullets. Https://www.haaretz.com/1.4742940. ↩↩

  4. Khalidi, Rashid. 2020. The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917--2017. Metropolitan Books. ↩↩↩↩↩

  5. B'Tselem. 2017. The Separation Barrier. Https://www.btselem.org/separation\ _barrier. ↩

  6. Baconi, Tareq. 2018. Hamas Contained - The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. Stanford University Press. ↩

  7. Knesset. 2004. "Disengagement Plan Implementation Law." In Jewish Virtual Library. Https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/text-of-the-gaza-disengagement-plan. ↩

  8. Human Rights Watch. 2022. Gaza: An 'Open-Air Prison'. ↩

  9. Tartir, Alaa. 2019. "Criminalizing Resistance: Security Sector Reform and Palestinian Authoritarianism." In Palestine and Rule of Power, edited by Alaa Tartir and Timothy Seidel. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05949-1. ↩↩↩↩

  10. International Crisis Group. 2008. Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model? 79. ↩

  11. Turner, Mandy. 2011. "Creating 'Partners for Peace': The Palestinian Authority and the International Statebuilding Agenda." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5 (1): 1--21. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541777. ↩

  12. Mustafa, Tahani. 2015. "Damming the Palestinian Spring: Security Sector Reform and Entrenched Repression." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9 (2): 212--30. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1020738. ↩

  13. Oslo Accords. 1993. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. ↩

  14. Chappuis, Fairlie, and Heiner Hänggi. 2013. Statebuilding Through Security Sector Reform. Edited by David Chandler and Timothy D Sisk. The Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding. ↩↩

  15. Tartir, Alaa. 2015. "The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993--2013." Stability: International Journal of Security\ & Development 4 (1): 287298--20. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.gi. ↩

  16. Gordon, Neve. 2008. Israel's Occupation. University of California Press. University of California Press. ↩

  17. Kienscherf, Markus. 2011. "A Programme of Global Pacification: US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Biopolitics of Human (In)security." Security Dialogue 42 (6): 517--35. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611423268. ↩

  18. UNWRA. 2015b. Profile: Jenin Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. ↩

  19. UNWRA. 2015a. Profile: Balata Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. ↩

  20. Amnesty International. 2002. Israel/OT: Fear for Safety Palestinians in Jenin Refugee Camp. MDE 15/038/2002. Amnesty International. ↩

  21. Human Rights Watch. 2002. Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories - Jenin: Idf Military Operations. 14 (3): 1--50. ↩